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ABSTRACT
Recent studies have highlighted adversarial examples as ubiquitous
threats to the deep neural network (DNN) based speech recognition
systems. In this work, we present a U-Net based attention model, U-
NetAt, to enhance adversarial speech signals. Specifically, we evalu-
ate the model performance by interpretable speech recognition met-
rics and discuss the model performance by the augmented adversar-
ial training. Our experiments show that our proposed U-NetAt im-
proves the perceptual evaluation of speech quality (PESQ) from 1.13
to 2.78, speech transmission index (STI) from 0.65 to 0.75, short-
term objective intelligibility (STOI) from 0.83 to 0.96 on the task
of speech enhancement with adversarial speech examples. We con-
duct experiments on the automatic speech recognition (ASR) task
with adversarial audio attacks. We find that (i) temporal features
learned by the attention network are capable of enhancing the ro-
bustness of DNN based ASR models; (ii) the generalization power
of DNN based ASR model could be enhanced by applying adversar-
ial training with an additive adversarial data augmentation. The ASR
metric on word-error-rates (WERs) shows that there is an absolute
2.22 % decrease under gradient-based perturbation, and an absolute
2.03 % decrease, under evolutionary-optimized perturbation, which
suggests that our enhancement models with adversarial training can
further secure a resilient ASR system.
Index Terms— Adversarial Examples, Adversarial Robustness,
Robust Speech Recognition, Speech Recognition Safety
1. INTRODUCTION
Deep neural networks (DNNs) on many audio and multimedia recog-
nition tasks have attained many state-of-the-art benchmark results [1,
2]. However, DNNs have been shown to be vulnerable to small addi-
tive noises upon inputs with adversarial examples [3]. In particular,
audio adversarial examples [4] were proposed based on the gradi-
ent [4] or gradient-free [5] optimization on a targeted loss function,
which induces DNN models to make incorrect classification (e.g., a
malicious text output, as ”open-the-door”) or degraded performance.
As a new challenge on ASR [4, 6], adversarial examples for
ASR are generated with a small maximum-distortion constrained in
magnitude (e.g., SNR) that they could be hard to be detected or no-
ticed upon evaluation metrics and listening. Unfortunately, effective
model defense and denoising approaches against audio adversarial
examples are still under exploration. Yang et al. [7] proposed a de-
tection method by using temporal dependency (TD) with a high de-
tection rate (93.6%) on audio adversarial examples. However, an
ASR system with a TD-framework is not capable of correcting ad-
versarial inputs and thus has to abandon many real-time audio exam-
ples under a continuous adversarial noise generator.
Our study is built on DNN-based speech enhancement, which
can transform adversarial speech examples into enhanced speech.
As shown in Fig. 1, the self-attention enhancement methods are
adopted to improve the ASR performance under adversarial pertur-
bation. We summarize the related generative and defense works on
audio adversarial examples and speech enhancement as follows:
Audio Adversarial Examples. To craft adversarial examples
against DNN-based ASR systems, security challenges, including
speech-to-text and speech classification, have been recently studied
by adversary loss optimization. Cisse et al. [8] introduced a prob-
abilistic loss function to degrade ASR performance. Carlini and
Wagner [4] applied a two-step adversarial optimization with an l∞
norm constrains, which attained a 100% attacking success rate on
ASR. Iter et al. [9] leveraged specific extracted audio features like
Mel Frequency Cepstral Coefficients (MFCCs) to improve the at-
tacking effectiveness of adversarial examples. Alzantotet et al. [10]
and Khare et al. [5] proposed evolutionary algorithms in a black-box
adversarial security setting without accessing the model information
of DNN based ASR. However, the previous works did not consider
the over-the-air effects in ASR settings as a threat model in the
physical world. Qin et al. [11] proposed an unbounded max-norm
optimization to improve the imperceptibility of audio adversarial
examples but did not play over-the-air (the experiment works on a
room-simulator).
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Fig. 1: The proposed a self-attention U-Net (U-NetAt) structure for
improving the adversarial robustness by processing before ASR.
In recent work, H.Yakura and J. Sakuma [6] put forth a method
to generate a robust adversarial example that could attack Deep-
Speech [12] under the over-the-air condition (e.g., the given adver-
sarial example played by speaker and radio.) In our work, we employ
both the gradient and gradient-free adversarial algorithms in our en-
hancement methods, and try to minimize physical threats of robust
adversarial examples in the over the air setting [6].
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Speech Enhancement and Denoising Methods. A speech
enhancement system aims to improve the speech quality and intelli-
gibility [2, 13, 14]. Several DNN-based vector-to-vector regression
architectures [15, 1] for single-channel speech enhancement have
attained many state-of-the-art results under non-stationary noises.
However, audio adversarial examples, which are taken as new
threats to environments, are not sufficiently discussed whether the
deep learning based speech enhancement models can overcome
them. Thus, the recent work have started to attempt data augmen-
tation approaches based on adversarial examples to improve the
model robustness against adversarial perturbations [16, 17]. One
major weakness of the adversarial training is that they are highly
model-dependent, which means that they may become unstable
when there is a strong adversarial perturbation (e.g., an increased
magnitude in the gradient-based attacks). In this work, we combine
enhancement-based method with temporal features [7].
To further understand the effects of adversarial examples, we
introduce a novel self-attention DNN model, which is sensitive to
temporal-sequence segments, and design experiments based on an
ASR system to conduct speech enhancement particularly against ad-
versarial perturbations.
Our contributions include:
• We introduce speech enhancement-based methods to charac-
terize the properties of audio adversarial examples and im-
prove the robustness of the ASR systems. Specifically, a self-
attention U-Net model, U-NetAt, is introduced to extract the
temporal information from the speech with adversarial per-
turbations, and then to reconstruct speech examples.
• We investigate interpretable effects of adversarial examples
for speech processing in terms of major speech quality mea-
surement index, including perceptual evaluation of speech
quality (PESQ), short-term objective intelligibility (STOI),
and speech transmission index (STI).
• We further study the generalization capability of DNN mod-
els for exploring the difference of performance among ASR
systems via applying both gradient and gradient-free genera-
tive models training by adversarial speech data augmentation.
2. AUDIO ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
This section briefly introduces how to use adversarial examples to
attack ASR models, which include gradient based [4], evolution-
ary [5], and over-the-air adversarial optimization methods [6].
2.1. Generating Gradient based Audio Adversarial Examples
An adversarial example is defined as follows: given a well-trained
prediction model f : Rn → {1, 2, · · · , k} and an input sample
x ∈ Rn, an attacker expects to modify x such that the model can
recognize the sample as having a specified output y ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k}
and the modification does not change the sample significantly. The
work [3] proposed v = x˜ − x ≤ δ be the perturbation, where δ
is a parameter with an upper-bounded magnitude of distortion. The
distortion is imposed to the input x that humans cannot notice the
difference between a legitimate input x and the distorted example
x˜. Besides, adversarial examples can be generated by optimizing an
objective function as shown in Eq. (1), whereLoss(x+v, y) refers to
a loss function by calculating an attacked prediction and the ground
truth, and  is the noise-level:
argmin
v
Loss(x+ v, y) + ‖v‖ (1)
Baseline Audio Adversarial Example. Particularly, for audio
and speech adversarial examples, Mel-Frequency Cepstrum Ceof-
ficient (MFCC) [4, 6, 11] is used for temporal feature extraction,
MFCC can be generated in a gradient-based optimization from an
entire waveform using Adam [18]. In detail, the perturbation v for
MFCC can be obtained against the input sample x and the target
output of phrase y using the loss function of a ASR system (e.g.,
DeepSpeech [12]) as follows:
argmin
v
Loss(MFCC(x+ v),y) + ‖v‖ (2)
MFCC(x+v) represents the MFCC extraction from speech signals
of x + v. In the previous work [4], this attacking model attains a
100% success rate on maliciously manipulate the output of speech
processing in the non-over-the air condition.
Audio Adversarial Examples by Evolutionary Optimization.
Khare et al. [5] proposed a multi-objective evolutionary optimiza-
tion method to craft adversarial examples on ASR systems instead of
gradient-based approaches [4, 6]. The proposed evolutionary-based
method [5] focus on maximizing a fitness function, which decom-
poses the adversarial audio quality metric into two objectives: (a) an
Euclidean similarity distance of MFCC features; (b) an edit similar-
ity distance of generated texts. In our experiment, we use the evo-
lutionary optimization combined with the over-the-air loss function
in [6] as a gradient-free comparison (Evoadv .)
Over-the-Air Adversarial Example. H.Yakura & J. Sakuma [6]
proposed a method to generate an over-the-air adversarial example
in the real-world. The main modification is to incorporate trans-
formations caused by playback and recording into the generation
process, and adapt to three constrains: a band-pass filter, impulse
response, and white Gaussian noise to minimize loss function:
argmin
v
Eh∼H,w∼N(0,σ2)[Loss(MFCC(x˜),y) + ‖v‖]
where x = Conv(x+ BPF
1000∼4000Hz
(v)) +w
(3)
where the set of collected impulse responses is H and the con-
volution using impulse response h is Conv, white Gaussian noise is
given by N(0, σ2), and an empirical band-pass filter from 1,000 to
4,000Hz exhibited less distortion.
In this work, we testify the adversarial generating models like
the gradient based [6] (Gradadv) and evolutionary generated [5]
(Evoadv) examples in the over-the-air filtering setting [6]. In a more
serious adversarial setting, we study the adversarial robustness under
adaptive attacks where an ASR model is highly relied on a speech
enhancement model, which follows the two-step attack setting in
Qin et al. [11].
3. MODEL DEFENSE BY U-NET BASED SPEECH
ENHANCEMENT
U-Net [19] refers to deep feature contracting networks by successive
layers, where pooling blocks are replaced by up-sampling blocks
and large number of feature channels. U-Net was first introduced
on image segmentation and attained several state-of-the-art re-
sults [19]. Recently, Wave-U-Net was proposed by [20] to improve
audio source separation and speech enhancement [21]. However,
the previous U-Net-based methods did not consider the sequence-
to-sequence mechanism such as temporal dependency. Especially,
with the recent evidence [7] on the adversarial defense, most audio
adversarial examples are with the specific temporal dependency,
which indicate that the deep regression-based method [7] would re-
main challenges in correcting or enhancement the adversarial speech
examples. Our proposed self-attention speech U-Net (U-NetAt) is a
one-dimensional U-Net with down-sampling blocks and a sequen-
tial attention gate embedded up-sampling blocks to improve the
adversarial robustness as the framwork in Fig. 1.
3.1. Self-Attention U-Net for Adversarial Speech Enhancement
As to a deployment of the U-Net [20] architecture for speech en-
hancement, we aim to separate a mixture waveformm ∈ [−1, 1]L×C ,
as shown in Figure 1, into source waveform S1 and the adversarial
waveform Sadv ∈ [−1, 1]L×C for all k ∈ 1, 2, where C refers to
the number of audio channels and L denotes the number of audio
samples. For two sources to be reconstructed, a 1D convolution,
zero padded before convolving, of filter size 1 with 2 × 1 filters is
utilized to convert the stack loss of features of (i) the clean speech
example and reconstructed waveform; (ii). We use a block number
L = 17, C = 1 for our experiments as the validated results in [21].
Attention Gate. The attention gate in the upsampling block(s)
extracts a high-level feature representation h from the input speech
feature x, where the hQt andH
K
t are the query and key, respectively:
hQt ,H
K = Encoder (xt); ct = Attention
(
hQt ,H
K ,xc
)
,
(4)
where the attention mechanism takes the query hQt and key H
k
t =
[h0, ..., ht] as input and devise a fixed-length context vector, ct. The
enhanced speech is yt, which takes the context vector ct, the upcom-
ing channel input xt, and the symmetry downsamping channel block
cropping concatenation input xc. We adopt the scaled dot-product
softmax function for self-attention transformation in [22].
3.2. Speech Enhancement Baseline
We use the publicly available benchmark LibriSpeech dataset [23].
Firstly, we down-sample the speech sampling rate to 16kHz as pre-
vious studies [20]. The clean data consists of 30 hours training
data and 5 hours testing data, which were from 73 male and fe-
male English-speakers with various accents. The noisy data were
generated by mixing the clean data with the noise source from the
DEMAND noise database [24]. To be consistent with the baseline
results in [21], we used 40 different noise to corrupt clean speech
to generate noisy speech with 4 SNR levels (15, 10, 5, and 0 dB). In
sum, there were 8,345 training data and 1,242 test data in our dataset.
Metric NoisyD DNN U-NetW U-NetAt
PESQ 1.97 2.62 2.86 2.88
STI 0.65 0.73 0.81 0.81
STOI 0.82 0.90 0.93 0.92
SNR -1.63 7.67 9.83 9.85
Table 1: We evaluate the untreated noisy signal (NoistD) in [24],
and the enhanced signals based on DNN, wave U-Net (as U-NetW ),
and self -attention U-Net (as U-NetAt). The experimental results
show that the U-Net based methods attain higher scores compared
with DNN-based methods on the noisy speech.
3.3. Performance Analysis
To validate the general enhancement performance, we evaluate the
baseline performance by major objective indexes as follows:
SNR. We first used the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the pertur-
bation, which could be generated by adding noisy samples [24] or
adversarial noise as the Sec. 2. The SNR is given by 10log10Px/Pv
for the power of the input sample, Px = 1T
∑T
t=1 x
2
t , and the power
of perturbation, Pv = 1T
∑T
t=1 v
2
t as the previous setting [6].
PSEQ. PESQ [25] score is computed as a sum value of the average
disturbance dsym and the average asymmetrical disturbance dasym:
PESQ = a0 + a1 · dsym + a2 · dasym (5)
where a0 = 4.5, a1 = −0.1 and a2 = −0.0309 for interpretability.
STI. STI [26] is an objective method for prediction and measurement
of speech intelligibility, which has been not covered in the previous
adversarial studies [11, 6, 5] for analyzing speech quality.
STOI. STOI [27] could be used as a robust measurement index for
nonlinear processing to noisy speech, e.g., noise reduction on speech
intelligibility, but it has been yet evaluated on the adversarial exam-
ples.
Enhancement Effects on Adversarial Examples After having a
well-trained DNN-based SE models, we test the enhancement effects
on the generated over-the-air audio adversarial examples [6] against
Deep Speech [12]. Although SNR scores of all models are increased
after speech enhancement, the performance in terms of PESQ, STI,
and STOI are consistently decreased, which suggests the necessity
of conducting a resilient ASR accessibility in Table. 1 and Table. 2.
Metric Noisyadv DNN U-NetW U-NetAt
PESQ 1.31 1.21 1.16 1.18
STI 0.67 0.66 0.62 0.64
STOI 0.84 0.81 0.80 0.81
SNR -1.52 7.23 7.43 7.68
Table 2: We repeat the experiments of speech enhancement in Table
1 where the over-the-air adversarial speech examples (Noisyadv) [6]
were imposed to the ASR loss function. The evaluation results show
that although all of the SNR scores increase by the speech enhance-
ment, the other metric indexes are even lower than the Noisyadv be-
fore conducting speech enhancement.
Robust Enhancement by Adversarial Training. Goodfellow
et al. [3] showed that by training on a mixture of adversarial and
clean examples, a neural network could be regularized and robust
enough against to adversarial examples. We adopt the adversarial
training with an objective function based on the fast gradient sign
method as an effective regularizer for a loss function J˜ :
J˜(θ,x, y) = αJ(θ,x, y)+(1−α)J (θ,x+  sign (∇xJ(θ,x, y)) ,
(6)
where x and y separately denote the noisy input and the clean output,
and model parameters are represented as θ. In all of our experiments,
we used an empirically fin-tinning setting asα = 0.34 to conduct the
enhancement results training on the generated adversarial examples.
As Table. 4, all the models shows an improved performance with
adversarial training.
4. EXPERIMENT RESULTS
4.1. ASR Experiment Setting
We applied the proposed U-NetAt to enhance adversarial speech ex-
amples as the same reproducible settings and configurations in [6].
Metric Noisyadv DNNT U-NetT,W U-NetT,At
PESQ 1.31 2.55 2.72 2.78
STI 0.67 0.69 0.72 0.75
STOI 0.84 0.86 0.88 0.90
SNR -1.52 7.45 7.67 7.92
Table 3: To further improve the model generalization capability, we
add adversarial examples into the dataset for the adversarial training.
We observe that the model obtains a further improvement in terms
of the intellectual speech quality based on the methods of the ad-
versarial training on DNN (DNNT ), wave U-Net (U-NetT,W ), and
self-attention U-Net (U-NetT,At) with slightly improved SNRs.
Method Gradadv DNN U-NetW U-NetAt
1: Baseline-ROSA 90.23 84.86 83.43 83.11
2: SEAdvT -ROSA 27.34 22.21 19.29 18.23
1: Baseline-WER 85.90 72.97 67.46 66.12
2: SEAdvT -WER 19.37 18.92 17.64 17.15
Method Evoadv DNN U-NetW U-NetAt
3: Baseline-ROSA 91.21 85.67 82.03 79.35
4: SEAdvT -ROSA 20.47 18.45 17.81 16.14
3: Baseline-WER 87.90 83.12 79.20 71.12
4: SEAdvT -WER 19.45 19.42 18.44 17.42
Table 4: To improve the adversarial robustness of the ASR, we mod-
ify the input with the U-NetAt-based speech enhancement with ad-
versarial training (SEAdvT ). The use of gradient-based adversarial
examples (Gradadv in [6]) can improve the performance in terms of
the rate of succeed attack (ROSA) and the word error rate (WER
%). Compared with Gradadv , the evolutionary-optimized [5] adver-
sarial examples (Evoadv in [5]) exhibits a higher error rate without
SEAdvT , but WER under SEAdvT can obtain more gains than the
Gradadv . Targeted text output is ”open-the-door”.
The first clip was the same as the publicly released samples of [4].
For the target phrase y, we prepared the target text: open the door.
Since the previous works [4, 6] tested the methods with randomly
chosen 1,000 phrases. We follow the over-the-air [6] evaluation set-
ting with the LibriSpeech dataset [23] which involves a number of
playback cycles in the physical world.
4.2. ASR Performance Discussion
The success rate of the attack is the ratio of the times that Mozilla
DeepSpeech [12] 1 transcribed the recorded adversarial example
as the target phrases among all trials. The success rate becomes
non-zero only when Mozilla DeepSpeech transcribes adversarial
examples as the target phrases perfectly. The generated audio with
high adversarial examples remain a SNR of 10.12 (dB) for all the
experiments. In Table. 4, the model trained on NoisyG could not
attain a high WER and ROSA under Gradadv and Evoadv without
the improved performance from the adaptive training with related
adversarial examples. Fig 2. shows the spectrogram difference in
the recovered detail of speech enhancement and adversarial training.
Characterising the Adaptive Adversarial Robustness. In
more strict adversarial security setting [11], an attacker could ob-
serve the input xˆ and output yˆ of both speech enhancement and ASR
1The Mozilla DeepSpeech ASR is the current audio adversarial robust-
ness benchmark [11, 4, 6] and shows coherent performance including Kaldi
[5, 11] under adversarial attacks from the previous studies.
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Fig. 2: The log-power spectrogram of (a) clean; (b) noisy; (c) ad-
versarial; (d) pre-trained U-NetAt enhanced adversarial examples;
(e) DNN enhancement results adopted adversarial training, and (f)
proposed U-NetAt using adversarial training (AdvT.)
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Fig. 3: In a more strict adversarial security setting, we evaluate the
SNR magnitude of the GradAdv and EvoAdv under U-NetAt SE.
system2, to craft a two-step adversarial examples in an existence of
defense model. When this theoretical adaptive attack exist, we aim
to enlarge the cost of attack in terms of additive noise (dB) injected
into the clean speech example to access a targeted attack successful
rate (TASR.) In Fig. 3, the results show that an attacker need to
give additive noise from 7.63 dB (w/o enhancement) to -2.23 dB (w/
U-NetAt) for the Gradadv and 7.82 dB (w/o enhancement) -3.21 dB
(w/ U-NetAt) on the Evoadv on the Deep Speech-based ASR system
to attain 100% TASR, which increase the empirical difficulty for
attackers to manipulate an attack without notice in the real world
and improve the adversarial robustness of ASR system.
5. CONCLUSIONS
We demonstrate the power of adversarial speech enhancement by
proposed self-attention U-Net, U-NetAt, for characterizing adver-
sarial examples generated by two state-of-the-art audio adversarial
attacks [6, 5] in the over-the-air setting. The proposed enhance-
ment method is different from previous detection based methods.
Our results highlight the importance of ASR and speech processing
safety on exploiting unique data properties toward adversarial ro-
bustness. Our future works included acoustic properties and causal
learning [28] on analysis of the speech AEs in a pre-trained or trans-
fer learning based ASR system.
2In our case, the system is equal to pre-processing U-NetAt model and
Deep Speech ASR for adaptive adversarial attack as [11]
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